国際原子力機関（ＩＡＥＡ)の天野之弥事務局長は１８日、「イラン核査察協定履行報告書」を理事国３５カ国に提出した。天野氏はそこで初めて「イランの核兵器製造の可能性」について言及した。それに対し、イランのＩＡＥＡ担当ソルタニエ大使は「報告書ではウランの濃縮度が３・５％から２０％に高められたという事実だけが新しい。その以外の内容はこれまで明らかになった内容の繰り返しに過ぎない。天野氏の報告は米国の見解をコピーしただけだ」と反論した。
３月１日から今年最初の定例理事会が開催されるが、そこで天野事務局長の「イランの核兵器製造」の懸念について、理事国間で激しいやり取りが予想される。
そこで全１０頁からなる「イラン報告書」の中で、天野事務局長が「イランの核兵器製造の可能性」を言及した「あり得る軍用次元」を紹介する。天野氏の「イランの核兵器製造への懸念」に正当性があるか、それとも「米国のプロパガンダのコピーに過ぎない」と主張するイラン側が正しいか、読者と一緒に考えてみたい。
E. Possible Military Dimensions
40. In order to confirm, as required by the Safeguards Agreement, that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities, the Agency needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran, including, inter alia, that Iran implement the Additional Protocol and provide the Agency with the information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R & D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to the defence industries.
41. The Information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It has also broadly consistent and credible in terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile related aspects, run by military related organizations.
42. Among the activities which the Agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re- entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2
to UF4, known as “the green salt project”, and various procurement related activities. Specifically, the Agency has, inter alia, sought clarification of the following: whether Iran was engaged in undeclared activities for the production of UF4 (green salt) involving the Kimia Maadan company; whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modelling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment.
43. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons. Addressing these issues is important for clarifying the Agency’s concerns about these activities and those described above, which seem to have continued beyond 2004.
44. Since August 20078, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the Agency or to provide any further information and access (to locations and/or people) to address these concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forgeries.
45. With the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is important that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to interview relevant persons, without further delay. Iran’s substantive engagement would enable the Agency to make progress in its work. Through Iran’s active cooperation , progress has been made in the past in certain other areas where questions have been raised; this should also be possible in connection with questions about military related dimensions.
上記の内容を一読すれば、イランの一連の核関連活動が「核兵器製造の疑惑を誘発する」と推測し、懸念を表明することは核エネルギーの平和利用を掲げるＩＡＥＡとしては当然の対応といえるだろう。イランの「核兵器製造疑惑」は、「限りなく黒に近い灰色」だ。
イランが「わが国の核計画は核エネルギーの平和利用を目的としたものだ」と主張し続けるためには、ＩＡＥＡが提示した未解決問題に対し、早急に返答すべきだろう。国際社会の一員として、イランには「説明責任」がある。
３月１日から今年最初の定例理事会が開催されるが、そこで天野事務局長の「イランの核兵器製造」の懸念について、理事国間で激しいやり取りが予想される。
そこで全１０頁からなる「イラン報告書」の中で、天野事務局長が「イランの核兵器製造の可能性」を言及した「あり得る軍用次元」を紹介する。天野氏の「イランの核兵器製造への懸念」に正当性があるか、それとも「米国のプロパガンダのコピーに過ぎない」と主張するイラン側が正しいか、読者と一緒に考えてみたい。
E. Possible Military Dimensions
40. In order to confirm, as required by the Safeguards Agreement, that all nuclear material in Iran is in peaceful activities, the Agency needs to have confidence in the absence of possible military dimensions to Iran’s nuclear programme. Previous reports by the Director General have detailed the outstanding issues and the actions required of Iran, including, inter alia, that Iran implement the Additional Protocol and provide the Agency with the information and access necessary to: resolve questions related to the alleged studies; clarify the circumstances of the acquisition of the uranium metal document; clarify procurement and R & D activities of military related institutes and companies that could be nuclear related; and clarify the production of nuclear related equipment and components by companies belonging to the defence industries.
41. The Information available to the Agency in connection with these outstanding issues is extensive and has been collected from a variety of sources over time. It has also broadly consistent and credible in terms of the technical detail, the time frame in which the activities were conducted and the people and organizations involved. Altogether, this raises concerns about the possible existence in Iran of past or current undisclosed activities related to the development of a nuclear payload for a missile related aspects, run by military related organizations.
42. Among the activities which the Agency has attempted to discuss with Iran are: activities involving high precision detonators fired simultaneously; studies on the initiation of high explosives and missile re- entry body engineering; a project for the conversion of UO2
to UF4, known as “the green salt project”, and various procurement related activities. Specifically, the Agency has, inter alia, sought clarification of the following: whether Iran was engaged in undeclared activities for the production of UF4 (green salt) involving the Kimia Maadan company; whether Iran’s exploding bridgewire detonator activities were solely for civil or conventional military purposes; whether Iran developed a spherical implosion system, possibly with the assistance of a foreign expert knowledgeable in explosives technology; whether the engineering design and computer modelling studies aimed at producing a new design for the payload chamber of a missile were for a nuclear payload; and the relationship between various attempts by senior Iranian officials with links to military organizations in Iran to obtain nuclear related technology and equipment.
43. The Agency would also like to discuss with Iran: the project and management structure of alleged activities related to nuclear explosives; nuclear related safety arrangements for a number of the alleged projects; details relating to the manufacture of components for high explosives initiation systems; and experiments concerning the generation and detection of neutrons. Addressing these issues is important for clarifying the Agency’s concerns about these activities and those described above, which seem to have continued beyond 2004.
44. Since August 20078, Iran has declined to discuss the above issues with the Agency or to provide any further information and access (to locations and/or people) to address these concerns, asserting that the allegations relating to possible military dimensions to its nuclear programme are baseless and that the information to which the Agency is referring is based on forgeries.
45. With the passage of time and the possible deterioration in the availability of information, it is important that Iran engage with the Agency on these issues, and that the Agency be permitted to visit all relevant sites, have access to all relevant equipment and documentation, and be allowed to interview relevant persons, without further delay. Iran’s substantive engagement would enable the Agency to make progress in its work. Through Iran’s active cooperation , progress has been made in the past in certain other areas where questions have been raised; this should also be possible in connection with questions about military related dimensions.
上記の内容を一読すれば、イランの一連の核関連活動が「核兵器製造の疑惑を誘発する」と推測し、懸念を表明することは核エネルギーの平和利用を掲げるＩＡＥＡとしては当然の対応といえるだろう。イランの「核兵器製造疑惑」は、「限りなく黒に近い灰色」だ。
イランが「わが国の核計画は核エネルギーの平和利用を目的としたものだ」と主張し続けるためには、ＩＡＥＡが提示した未解決問題に対し、早急に返答すべきだろう。国際社会の一員として、イランには「説明責任」がある。
